Empirical welfare economics / Christopher P. Chambers; Federico Echenique.
Material type:
ArticleLanguage: English Publisher: [Place of publication not identified] : Econometric Society, 2025Description: 1 online resource (1 article)Content type: - text
- computer
- online resource
Publication type: Journal article.
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Welfare economics relies on access to agents' utility functions: we revisit classical questions in welfare economics, assuming access to data on agents' past choices instead of their utilities. Our main result considers the existence of utilities that render a given allocation Pareto optimal. We show that a candidate allocation is efficient for some utilities consistent with the choice data if and only if it is efficient for an incomplete relation derived from the revealed preference relations and convexity. Similar ideas are used to make counterfactual choices for a single consumer, policy comparisons by the Kaldor criterion, and offer bounds on the degree of inefficiency in a Pareto suboptimal allocation.
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https://openalex.org/W3191345892
In English.
Description generated from OpenAlex bibliographic metadata retrieved on 5 October 2026; full text linked from the source.
Course allocation: B. Sc. Politics, Philosophy and Economics.
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