Empirical welfare economics /
Christopher P. Chambers
Empirical welfare economics / Christopher P. Chambers; Federico Echenique. - 1 online resource (1 article).
Publication type: Journal article. Linked open-access copy: published version.
Open access; no subscription required for the linked open-access version.
Welfare economics relies on access to agents' utility functions: we revisit classical questions in welfare economics, assuming access to data on agents' past choices instead of their utilities. Our main result considers the existence of utilities that render a given allocation Pareto optimal. We show that a candidate allocation is efficient for some utilities consistent with the choice data if and only if it is efficient for an incomplete relation derived from the revealed preference relations and convexity. Similar ideas are used to make counterfactual choices for a single consumer, policy comparisons by the Kaldor criterion, and offer bounds on the degree of inefficiency in a Pareto suboptimal allocation.
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial (licence family recorded by the source; version not supplied in metadata).
In English.
10.3982/te5845 doi
revealed preference
utility functions
Pareto optimality
choice data
incomplete preferences
convexity
B. Sc. Politics, Philosophy and Economics UMUN open access collection welfare economics
Journal articles.
Empirical welfare economics / Christopher P. Chambers; Federico Echenique. - 1 online resource (1 article).
Publication type: Journal article. Linked open-access copy: published version.
Open access; no subscription required for the linked open-access version.
Welfare economics relies on access to agents' utility functions: we revisit classical questions in welfare economics, assuming access to data on agents' past choices instead of their utilities. Our main result considers the existence of utilities that render a given allocation Pareto optimal. We show that a candidate allocation is efficient for some utilities consistent with the choice data if and only if it is efficient for an incomplete relation derived from the revealed preference relations and convexity. Similar ideas are used to make counterfactual choices for a single consumer, policy comparisons by the Kaldor criterion, and offer bounds on the degree of inefficiency in a Pareto suboptimal allocation.
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial (licence family recorded by the source; version not supplied in metadata).
In English.
10.3982/te5845 doi
revealed preference
utility functions
Pareto optimality
choice data
incomplete preferences
convexity
B. Sc. Politics, Philosophy and Economics UMUN open access collection welfare economics
Journal articles.