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| 001 | UMUN-OA-20261005-PS-046 | ||
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| 005 | 20261005174851.0 | ||
| 006 | m o d | ||
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| 008 | 261005s2025 xx o u000 0 eng d | ||
| 024 | 7 |
_a10.1057/s41267-024-00769-5 _2doi |
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| 035 | _a(local)OpenAlex:W4407605462 | ||
| 040 |
_alocal _beng _clocal |
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| 041 | 0 | _aeng | |
| 100 | 0 |
_aMargherita Corina _eauthor. |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 |
_aHolding back the damage: strong political institutions and the effect of populism on business investment / _cMargherita Corina; Christopher Hartwell; Alfonso Carballo. |
| 264 | 1 |
_a[Place of publication not identified] : _bPalgrave Macmillan, _c2025. |
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| 300 | _a1 online resource (1 article). | ||
| 336 |
_atext _btxt _2rdacontent |
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| 337 |
_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia |
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| 338 |
_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier |
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| 500 | _aPublication type: Journal article. | ||
| 500 | _aLinked open-access copy: published version. | ||
| 506 | 0 |
_aOpen access; no subscription required for the linked open-access version. _fUnrestricted online access _2star |
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| 520 | 3 | _aAbstract Populism is a political phenomenon that attempts to harness existing institutions for populist ends, often leading to negative consequences for businesses. However, can national institutions resist this pressure and mitigate the damage to firms? This paper investigates how populist electoral success influences corporate investment, unraveling the intricate connection between a country’s political institutions and the investment behavior of companies. Through the lens of political uncertainty and transaction cost economics, we theorize that countries with fortified checks and balances—facilitated by electoral systems (situated at the entrance to power), judicial independence (supervising the exercise of power), and government accountability (serving as ex-post checks)—effectively mitigate populist impulses. However, these checks and balances are also often targeted by populist leaders, as they prevent full implementation of a populist agenda. Analyzing a dataset spanning over 36,000 firms across 42 countries from 1995 to 2021, we find that existing checks and balances shield firms from populist excesses. In line with our theory, the longer a ruler is in power, the weaker these checks and balances remain. Our study highlights populism’s harm to business and the role of robust political institutions as mitigating factors. | |
| 540 |
_aCreative Commons Attribution (licence family recorded by the source; version not supplied in metadata). _uhttps://openalex.org/W4407605462 |
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| 546 | _aIn English. | ||
| 588 | 0 | _aDescription generated from OpenAlex bibliographic metadata retrieved on 5 October 2026; full text linked from the source. | |
| 590 | _aCourse allocation: B. Sc. Political Science. | ||
| 650 | 4 | _apopulism | |
| 650 | 4 | _apolitical institutions | |
| 650 | 4 | _acorporate investment | |
| 650 | 4 | _achecks and balances | |
| 650 | 4 | _ajudicial independence | |
| 650 | 4 | _agovernment accountability | |
| 653 | _aB. Sc. Political Science | ||
| 653 | _aUMUN open access collection | ||
| 653 | _apolitical institutions | ||
| 655 | 4 | _aJournal articles. | |
| 700 | 0 |
_aChristopher Hartwell _eauthor. |
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| 700 | 0 |
_aAlfonso Carballo _eauthor. |
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| 773 | 0 |
_tJournal of International Business Studies _gVol. 56, no. 5, (2025), pages/article 608-630 _x0047-2506 |
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| 856 | 4 | 0 |
_uhttps://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1057/s41267-024-00769-5.pdf _yRead open-access publication _zOpen access. Access and licence reported by the source; this host could not be independently checked by automation. _70 |
| 884 |
_aCourse selection and automated MARC21 enrichment from OpenAlex metadata. _g20261005 _khttps://openalex.org/W4407605462 _qlocal |
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_c993 _d993 |
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