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024 7 _a10.1057/s41267-024-00769-5
_2doi
035 _a(local)OpenAlex:W4407605462
040 _alocal
_beng
_clocal
041 0 _aeng
100 0 _aMargherita Corina
_eauthor.
245 1 0 _aHolding back the damage: strong political institutions and the effect of populism on business investment /
_cMargherita Corina; Christopher Hartwell; Alfonso Carballo.
264 1 _a[Place of publication not identified] :
_bPalgrave Macmillan,
_c2025.
300 _a1 online resource (1 article).
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
500 _aPublication type: Journal article.
500 _aLinked open-access copy: published version.
506 0 _aOpen access; no subscription required for the linked open-access version.
_fUnrestricted online access
_2star
520 3 _aAbstract Populism is a political phenomenon that attempts to harness existing institutions for populist ends, often leading to negative consequences for businesses. However, can national institutions resist this pressure and mitigate the damage to firms? This paper investigates how populist electoral success influences corporate investment, unraveling the intricate connection between a country’s political institutions and the investment behavior of companies. Through the lens of political uncertainty and transaction cost economics, we theorize that countries with fortified checks and balances—facilitated by electoral systems (situated at the entrance to power), judicial independence (supervising the exercise of power), and government accountability (serving as ex-post checks)—effectively mitigate populist impulses. However, these checks and balances are also often targeted by populist leaders, as they prevent full implementation of a populist agenda. Analyzing a dataset spanning over 36,000 firms across 42 countries from 1995 to 2021, we find that existing checks and balances shield firms from populist excesses. In line with our theory, the longer a ruler is in power, the weaker these checks and balances remain. Our study highlights populism’s harm to business and the role of robust political institutions as mitigating factors.
540 _aCreative Commons Attribution (licence family recorded by the source; version not supplied in metadata).
_uhttps://openalex.org/W4407605462
546 _aIn English.
588 0 _aDescription generated from OpenAlex bibliographic metadata retrieved on 5 October 2026; full text linked from the source.
590 _aCourse allocation: B. Sc. Political Science.
650 4 _apopulism
650 4 _apolitical institutions
650 4 _acorporate investment
650 4 _achecks and balances
650 4 _ajudicial independence
650 4 _agovernment accountability
653 _aB. Sc. Political Science
653 _aUMUN open access collection
653 _apolitical institutions
655 4 _aJournal articles.
700 0 _aChristopher Hartwell
_eauthor.
700 0 _aAlfonso Carballo
_eauthor.
773 0 _tJournal of International Business Studies
_gVol. 56, no. 5, (2025), pages/article 608-630
_x0047-2506
856 4 0 _uhttps://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1057/s41267-024-00769-5.pdf
_yRead open-access publication
_zOpen access. Access and licence reported by the source; this host could not be independently checked by automation.
_70
884 _aCourse selection and automated MARC21 enrichment from OpenAlex metadata.
_g20261005
_khttps://openalex.org/W4407605462
_qlocal
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