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024 7 _a10.1016/j.worlddev.2024.106532
_2doi
035 _a(local)OpenAlex:W4390927409
040 _alocal
_beng
_clocal
041 0 _aeng
100 0 _aTania Masi
_eauthor.
245 1 0 _aIs there a fiscal resource curse? Resource rents, fiscal capacity and political institutions in developing economies /
_cTania Masi; Antonio Savoia; Kunal Sen.
264 1 _a[Place of publication not identified] :
_bElsevier BV,
_c2024.
300 _a1 online resource (1 article).
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
500 _aPublication type: Journal article.
500 _aLinked open-access copy: published version.
506 0 _aOpen access; no subscription required for the linked open-access version.
_fUnrestricted online access
_2star
520 3 _aWhile it is recognised that the ability of states to raise revenues (i.e., fiscal capacity) is important for the provision of key public goods in less developed economies, it is less clear what its determinants are and what explains cross-country differences. We focus on the impact of natural resources. Standard arguments suggest that natural resource rents may harm fiscal capacity, as governments tend to substitute tax revenues with revenues from natural resources. We argue, instead, that a fiscal resource curse may materialise or not depending on whether political institutions can limit the power of the executive and on how easy it is to control or appropriate natural resources. We investigate this hypothesis using panel data methods covering the period 1995–2015 for 62 developing countries. The results suggest that: (i) point-source resources are negatively associated with fiscal capacity, while diffuse resources are not; (ii) developing economies with political institutions placing institutionalised constraints on the executive power are able to neutralise the negative effect of point-source resources on fiscal capacity. Our findings imply that it is possible to develop a natural resources sector without necessarily harming fiscal capacity.
540 _aCreative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives (licence family recorded by the source; version not supplied in metadata).
_uhttps://openalex.org/W4390927409
546 _aIn English.
588 0 _aDescription generated from OpenAlex bibliographic metadata retrieved on 5 October 2026; full text linked from the source.
590 _aCourse allocation: B. Sc. Political Science.
650 4 _aresource curse
650 4 _afiscal capacity
650 4 _anatural resource rents
650 4 _apolitical institutions
650 4 _aexecutive power
650 4 _atax revenue
653 _aB. Sc. Political Science
653 _aUMUN open access collection
653 _apolitical institutions
655 4 _aJournal articles.
700 0 _aAntonio Savoia
_eauthor.
700 0 _aKunal Sen
_eauthor.
773 0 _tWorld Development
_gVol. 177, (2024), pages/article 106532
_x0305-750X
856 4 0 _uhttps://research.manchester.ac.uk/en/publications/8cf5397a-ec66-446e-acb9-f97639e1a962
_yRead open-access publication
_zOpen access.
_70
884 _aCourse selection and automated MARC21 enrichment from OpenAlex metadata.
_g20261005
_khttps://openalex.org/W4390927409
_qlocal
942 _n0
999 _c977
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