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008 261005s2018 xx o u000 0 eng d
024 7 _a10.1080/17449480.2018.1476772
_2doi
035 _a(local)OpenAlex:W2807142001
040 _alocal
_beng
_clocal
041 0 _aeng
100 0 _aNiclas Hellman
_eauthor.
245 1 0 _aIntroducing More IFRS Principles of Disclosure – Will the Poor Disclosers Improve? /
_cNiclas Hellman; Jordi Carenys; Soledad Moya Gutierrez.
264 1 _a[Place of publication not identified] :
_bRoutledge,
_c2018.
300 _a1 online resource (1 article).
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
500 _aPublication type: Journal article.
500 _aLinked open-access copy: published version.
506 0 _aOpen access; no subscription required for the linked open-access version.
_fUnrestricted online access
_2star
520 3 _aThe current paper was prepared for the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) Research Forum 2017 and evaluates the effects of introducing more principles of disclosure as part of the IASB Disclosure Initiative. We perform a literature review of academic research on how entities have complied with disclosure requirements in the past. The review shows high levels of non-compliance and high volatility across entities, including poor disclosers being far below the average. We find no clear pattern of higher compliance for International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) with more reliance on disclosure principles as compared to specific requirements (i.e. IFRS 7, IFRS 8), but note the methodological problem of measuring compliance with disclosure principles. Academic research suggests that the degree of compliance depends on entities’ incentives for providing or withholding information in combination with local conditions for primary users, auditors and regulators. Based on our review, we argue that increased reliance on entities to act in ‘good faith’ when complying with disclosure requirements, in capital-market contexts where entities may be in high-incentive situations and have low costs of non-compliance, is potentially risky in terms of how well the Standards protect primary users from poor disclosers. More emphasis is needed on ensuring that the disclosure requirements are enforceable and auditable in order to secure a certain minimum level of disclosure.
540 _aCreative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives (licence family recorded by the source; version not supplied in metadata).
_uhttps://openalex.org/W2807142001
546 _aIn English.
588 0 _aDescription generated from OpenAlex bibliographic metadata retrieved on 5 October 2026; full text linked from the source.
590 _aCourse allocation: B. Sc. Accounting.
650 4 _aIFRS 7
650 4 _aIFRS 8
650 4 _adisclosure enforcement
650 4 _aprimary users
650 4 _afinancial reporting regulation
653 _aB. Sc. Accounting
653 _aUMUN open access collection
653 _aIFRS
655 4 _aJournal articles.
700 0 _aJordi Carenys
_eauthor.
700 0 _aSoledad Moya Gutierrez
_eauthor.
773 0 _tAccounting in Europe
_gVol. 15, no. 2, (2018), pages/article 242-321
_x1744-9480
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17449480.2018.1476772?needAccess=true
_yRead open-access publication
_zOpen access. Access and licence reported by the source; this host could not be independently checked by automation.
_70
884 _aCourse selection and automated MARC21 enrichment from OpenAlex metadata.
_g20261005
_khttps://openalex.org/W2807142001
_qlocal
942 _n0
999 _c797
_d797