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008 261005s2024 xx o u000 0 eng d
024 7 _a10.1111/jors.12751
_2doi
035 _a(local)Crossref:10.1111/jors.12751
040 _alocal
_beng
_clocal
041 0 _aeng
100 0 _aTamara Fioroni
_eauthor.
245 1 0 _aOrganized Crime, Corruption, and Economic Growth /
_cTamara Fioroni; Andrea Mario Lavezzi; Giovanni Trovato.
264 1 _a[Place of publication not identified] :
_bWiley,
_c2024.
300 _a1 online resource (1 article).
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
500 _aPublication type: Journal article.
500 _aLinked open-access copy: published version.
506 0 _aOpen access; no subscription required for the linked open-access version.
_fUnrestricted online access
_2star
520 3 _aABSTRACT In this paper, we study the relationship between organized crime, corruption, and economic growth on a data set from Italian regions for the period 1996–2013. Our working hypothesis is that organized crime can embezzle part of the public expenditure aimed at productive uses by threatening and bribing public officers. To assess the consequences for regional growth we estimate a finite mixture covariate measurement model and find that the relationship between public expenditure and per capita GDP is characterized by parameter heterogeneity. Specifically, regions are partitioned in clusters identified by the initial level of organized crime. The effect of public expenditure on per capita GDP differs across clusters of regions: in the regions with the higher levels of organized crime public expenditure has a negative effect on per capita GDP, and the estimated share of embezzled public expenditure is higher, amounting to approximately 10% of its book value. Differently, in the regions with lower levels of organized crime the effect of public expenditure on per capita GDP is positive and the estimated share of embezzled public expenditure is lower. The empirical analysis is shown to be consistent with a theoretical growth model à la Barro (1990) augmented by corruption orchestrated by organized crime.
540 _aCreative Commons Attribution. See the linked licence for the applicable terms.
_uhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
546 _aIn English.
588 0 _aDescription generated from Crossref bibliographic metadata retrieved on 5 October 2026; full text linked from the source.
590 _aCourse allocation: B. Sc. Intelligence and Security Studies.
653 _aB. Sc. Intelligence and Security Studies
653 _aUMUN open access collection
653 _aorganized crime
655 4 _aJournal articles.
700 0 _aAndrea Mario Lavezzi
_eauthor.
700 0 _aGiovanni Trovato
_eauthor.
773 0 _tJournal of Regional Science
_gVol. 65, no. 2, (2024), pages/article 535-560
_x0022-4146
856 4 0 _uhttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jors.12751
_yRead open-access publication
_zOpen access. Access and licence reported by the source; this host could not be independently checked by automation.
_70
884 _aCourse selection and automated MARC21 enrichment from Crossref metadata.
_g20261005
_khttps://doi.org/10.1111/jors.12751
_qlocal
942 _n0
999 _c1365
_d1365