Risk diversification and vote decisions in mixed-member electoral systems / Susumu Shikano; Erik S. Herron.

By: Contributor(s): Material type: ArticleLanguage: English Publisher: [Place of publication not identified] : Springer Science+Business Media, 2025Description: 1 online resource (1 article)Content type:
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Subject(s): Genre/Form: In: Public Choice Vol. 204, no. 1-2, (2025), pages/article 203-219Abstract: Abstract This paper builds on the literature about mixed-member electoral systems, exploring how ballot design interacts with voter behavior. We present a theoretical model for vote decision-making in mixed-member systems that takes into account the interaction between both tiers. The model is grounded in a spatial model for vote decision-making under risk and inspired by the logic of portfolio diversification under risk. Accordingly, voters are modeled as risk-averse decision-makers who may prefer diversified vote packages (i.e. split-ticket) when party and candidate uncertainties are highly correlated. The risk diversification strategy abates when voters cast their votes sequentially. This finding provides a potential explanation for the impact of vote sequence in mixed-member systems, an under-investigated topic in the literature. It thus links the established literature on mixed-member systems with scholarship on ballot design and its effects. Additionally, the paper’s analysis explores the implications of combining the proposed model with the well-established wasted vote model.
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Publication type: Journal article.

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Abstract This paper builds on the literature about mixed-member electoral systems, exploring how ballot design interacts with voter behavior. We present a theoretical model for vote decision-making in mixed-member systems that takes into account the interaction between both tiers. The model is grounded in a spatial model for vote decision-making under risk and inspired by the logic of portfolio diversification under risk. Accordingly, voters are modeled as risk-averse decision-makers who may prefer diversified vote packages (i.e. split-ticket) when party and candidate uncertainties are highly correlated. The risk diversification strategy abates when voters cast their votes sequentially. This finding provides a potential explanation for the impact of vote sequence in mixed-member systems, an under-investigated topic in the literature. It thus links the established literature on mixed-member systems with scholarship on ballot design and its effects. Additionally, the paper’s analysis explores the implications of combining the proposed model with the well-established wasted vote model.

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https://openalex.org/W4411875197

In English.

Description generated from OpenAlex bibliographic metadata retrieved on 5 October 2026; full text linked from the source.

Course allocation: B. Sc. Political Science.

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