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  <titleInfo>
    <title>Holding back the damage: strong political institutions and the effect of populism on business investment</title>
  </titleInfo>
  <name type="personal">
    <namePart>Margherita Corina</namePart>
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      <roleTerm authority="marcrelator" type="text">creator</roleTerm>
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    <role>
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  <name type="personal">
    <namePart>Christopher Hartwell</namePart>
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      <roleTerm type="text">author.</roleTerm>
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  </name>
  <name type="personal">
    <namePart>Alfonso Carballo</namePart>
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  <genre authority="">Journal articles.</genre>
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    <dateIssued encoding="marc">2025</dateIssued>
    <issuance>monographic</issuance>
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  <abstract>Abstract Populism is a political phenomenon that attempts to harness existing institutions for populist ends, often leading to negative consequences for businesses. However, can national institutions resist this pressure and mitigate the damage to firms? This paper investigates how populist electoral success influences corporate investment, unraveling the intricate connection between a country’s political institutions and the investment behavior of companies. Through the lens of political uncertainty and transaction cost economics, we theorize that countries with fortified checks and balances—facilitated by electoral systems (situated at the entrance to power), judicial independence (supervising the exercise of power), and government accountability (serving as ex-post checks)—effectively mitigate populist impulses. However, these checks and balances are also often targeted by populist leaders, as they prevent full implementation of a populist agenda. Analyzing a dataset spanning over 36,000 firms across 42 countries from 1995 to 2021, we find that existing checks and balances shield firms from populist excesses. In line with our theory, the longer a ruler is in power, the weaker these checks and balances remain. Our study highlights populism’s harm to business and the role of robust political institutions as mitigating factors.</abstract>
  <note type="statement of responsibility">Margherita Corina; Christopher Hartwell; Alfonso Carballo.</note>
  <note>Publication type: Journal article.</note>
  <note>Linked open-access copy: published version.</note>
  <note>Open access; no subscription required for the linked open-access version. Unrestricted online access star</note>
  <note xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="https://openalex.org/W4407605462">Creative Commons Attribution (licence family recorded by the source; version not supplied in metadata). https://openalex.org/W4407605462</note>
  <note>In English.</note>
  <subject>
    <topic>populism</topic>
  </subject>
  <subject>
    <topic>political institutions</topic>
  </subject>
  <subject>
    <topic>corporate investment</topic>
  </subject>
  <subject>
    <topic>checks and balances</topic>
  </subject>
  <subject>
    <topic>judicial independence</topic>
  </subject>
  <subject>
    <topic>government accountability</topic>
  </subject>
  <subject>
    <topic>B. Sc. Political Science</topic>
  </subject>
  <subject>
    <topic>UMUN open access collection</topic>
  </subject>
  <subject>
    <topic>political institutions</topic>
  </subject>
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    <titleInfo>
      <title>Journal of International Business Studies</title>
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    <identifier type="issn">0047-2506</identifier>
    <part>
      <text>Vol. 56, no. 5, (2025), pages/article 608-630</text>
    </part>
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  <identifier type="uri">https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1057/s41267-024-00769-5.pdf</identifier>
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    <url displayLabel="Read open-access publication">https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1057/s41267-024-00769-5.pdf</url>
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    <recordIdentifier source="local">UMUN-OA-20261005-PS-046</recordIdentifier>
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