Oil Prices and International Conflict: Why Low Oil Revenue May Not Pacify Petrostates /
Brian Blankenship; Qaraman Hasan; Soran Mohtadi [and others].
- 1 online resource (1 article).
Publication type: Journal article. Linked open-access copy: published version.
Open access; no subscription required for the linked open-access version.
This article explores how declining oil revenue might shape the amount of international conflict initiated by major oil producers (petrostates). We analyze four potential mechanisms through which variation in oil prices could affect petrostate conflict initiation: emboldenment, battling over a smaller market, signaling strength, and diversionary conflict. The empirical findings suggest that higher oil prices are associated with lower rates of petrostate conflict initiation. From one standard deviation below the mean oil price to one standard deviation above it, the predicted number of militarized interstate disputes declines twofold, from .025 [95% CI: .016–.034] per petrostate per year to .012 [.007–.016]. Moreover, the evidence suggests that petrostates are more likely to target other petrostates when oil prices are low. This suggests that the energy transition may not be a boon for international peace among petrostates, and for a time, it may even prove to be the opposite.
Creative Commons Attribution (licence family recorded by the source; version not supplied in metadata).
In English.
10.1080/03050629.2024.2352486 doi
oil prices petrostates international conflict militarized interstate disputes conflict initiation energy transition
B. Sc. International Relations UMUN open access collection international conflict