<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<mods xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3" version="3.1" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-1.xsd">
  <titleInfo>
    <title>Empirical welfare economics</title>
  </titleInfo>
  <name type="personal">
    <namePart>Christopher P. Chambers</namePart>
    <role>
      <roleTerm authority="marcrelator" type="text">creator</roleTerm>
    </role>
    <role>
      <roleTerm type="text">author.</roleTerm>
    </role>
  </name>
  <name type="personal">
    <namePart>Federico Echenique</namePart>
    <role>
      <roleTerm type="text">author.</roleTerm>
    </role>
  </name>
  <typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource>
  <genre authority="">Journal articles.</genre>
  <originInfo>
    <place>
      <placeTerm type="code" authority="marccountry">xx</placeTerm>
    </place>
    <dateIssued encoding="marc">2025</dateIssued>
    <issuance>monographic</issuance>
  </originInfo>
  <language>
    <languageTerm authority="iso639-2b" type="code">eng</languageTerm>
  </language>
  <physicalDescription>
    <internetMediaType>application/pdf</internetMediaType>
    <extent>1 online resource (1 article).</extent>
  </physicalDescription>
  <abstract>Welfare economics relies on access to agents' utility functions: we revisit classical questions in welfare economics, assuming access to data on agents' past choices instead of their utilities. Our main result considers the existence of utilities that render a given allocation Pareto optimal. We show that a candidate allocation is efficient for some utilities consistent with the choice data if and only if it is efficient for an incomplete relation derived from the revealed preference relations and convexity. Similar ideas are used to make counterfactual choices for a single consumer, policy comparisons by the Kaldor criterion, and offer bounds on the degree of inefficiency in a Pareto suboptimal allocation.</abstract>
  <note type="statement of responsibility">Christopher P. Chambers; Federico Echenique.</note>
  <note>Publication type: Journal article.</note>
  <note>Linked open-access copy: published version.</note>
  <note>Open access; no subscription required for the linked open-access version. Unrestricted online access star</note>
  <note xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="https://openalex.org/W3191345892">Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial (licence family recorded by the source; version not supplied in metadata). https://openalex.org/W3191345892</note>
  <note>In English.</note>
  <subject>
    <topic>revealed preference</topic>
  </subject>
  <subject>
    <topic>utility functions</topic>
  </subject>
  <subject>
    <topic>Pareto optimality</topic>
  </subject>
  <subject>
    <topic>choice data</topic>
  </subject>
  <subject>
    <topic>incomplete preferences</topic>
  </subject>
  <subject>
    <topic>convexity</topic>
  </subject>
  <subject>
    <topic>B. Sc. Politics, Philosophy and Economics</topic>
  </subject>
  <subject>
    <topic>UMUN open access collection</topic>
  </subject>
  <subject>
    <topic>welfare economics</topic>
  </subject>
  <relatedItem type="host">
    <titleInfo>
      <title>Theoretical Economics</title>
    </titleInfo>
    <identifier type="issn">1555-7561</identifier>
    <part>
      <text>Vol. 20, no. 3, (2025), pages/article 911-939</text>
    </part>
  </relatedItem>
  <identifier type="uri">https://arxiv.org/pdf/2108.03277</identifier>
  <location>
    <url displayLabel="Read open-access publication">https://arxiv.org/pdf/2108.03277</url>
  </location>
  <accessCondition type="restrictionOnAccess">Open access; no subscription required for the linked open-access version.</accessCondition>
  <accessCondition type="useAndReproduction">Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial (licence family recorded by the source; version not supplied in metadata).</accessCondition>
  <recordInfo>
    <recordContentSource authority="marcorg">local</recordContentSource>
    <recordCreationDate encoding="marc">261005</recordCreationDate>
    <recordChangeDate encoding="iso8601">20261005174856.0</recordChangeDate>
    <recordIdentifier source="local">UMUN-OA-20261005-PPE-056</recordIdentifier>
    <languageOfCataloging>
      <languageTerm authority="iso639-2b" type="code">eng</languageTerm>
    </languageOfCataloging>
  </recordInfo>
</mods>
